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Foreword
Cr i t i c s  of  m a i n s t r e a m e c onom ics  h ave 
characterized economism as a prevalent ideology 
(Polanyi 1977; Ulrich 2008; Des Gapser 2004; Umeda 
2016a; Umeda 2016b). The key components of 
economism include a faith of economists in an 
autonomous economic system, the assumption of a 
utility maximizing selﬁ sh actor model, and a closed 
market concept clearly demarcated from the non-
market (Umeda 2016b). Of those, the selfish human 
actor model, so-called homo economicus (HE), 
enshrined in the base of mainstream economistsʼ 
theory, is the biggest source of concern as it has 
helped produce among citizens a recognition that 
economic actors ought to selfishly behave (Aldred 
2009).1
I  have a rg ued for  the need to overcome 
economism (Umeda 2016b). Once freed from yoke of 
economism, c i t i zens would be able  to  have 
unconventional, uninhibited views and approaches to 
socioeconomic realities. Scholars would be able to 
explain with ease consumersʼ irrational choices or 
actions characterized by behavioral economists as 
ʻanomalous behaviorsʼ or ʻanomaliesʼ (Thaler 1991) in 
the market. Replacing the conventional HE model 
with the homo socio-economicus (HSE) model is part 
of my proposal as a step forward to overcome 
economism and ﬁ nd ways to explain such anomalies 
in a diﬀ erent way behavioral economists do. 
The HSE model can by definition behave both 
selfishly and altruistically. The altruistic or other-
regarding behavior of the HSE model may generate 
economic inefficiency as a result of such actions 
taken out of concern for othersʼ or social interests2. I 
will argue in this paper that altruistic behaviors of 
consumers cannot be explained without any reference 
to such inefficient and (economically) irrational 
choices by economic actors in the market since 
altruistic, non-selfish, other-regarding behaviors of 
economic actors, as a matter of logic, ought to 
generate a fraction of ineﬃ  ciency, loss or waste in the 
course of such an action taken. 
I will ﬁ rst outline how the distance grew between 
economics and ethics in order to ascertain the role 
that the HE model has played in the growth. Next, I 
will examine the range of behavioral patterns that the 
HSE model can take, referring to the relationship 
between the HE model and the concept of economic 
rationality. This is followed by an analysis on how 
behavioral pat terns of HSE can help generate 
ineﬃ  ciency, loss or waste, with examples showcased 
of what I regard as ethical, or altruistic, behaviors of 
economic actors in the market. 
Distance between Economics and Ethics 
At around what time did the distance start to 
grow between economics and ethics?  The f irst 
ramification could be pinned down on what I call 
ʻself-interest pursuit formula,ʼ  the origin of which we 
can trace back to Adam Smith ʻs Wealth of Nations of 
1776 (Umeda 2016a). With hindsight, the formula, 
discrediting the value of pursuing social causes by 
commercial participants, set the direction in which 
modern economics has subsequently developed. 
The next ramification is so-called ʻMarginal 
Revolutionʼ (MR)3. MR led economists to challenge 
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1 “Assuming people are selfish becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, with the result that altruism, trust and cooperation are all undermined. And the 
assumption of selfishness can even act to exercise, or indirectly justify, immoral behavior.“(p. 12). The “Homo economicus doctrine actively 
recommends selﬁ shness.”
2 With the term ʻineﬃ  ciencyʼ I intend to not only convey the standard meaning of the word---not being eﬃ  cient. I also intend to use the word to imply 
something uneconomical, waste, loss, or additional burden or cost incurred, trying to cover all the deviations from the concept of ʻrationalityʼ as an ideal 
or standard which mainstream economists espouse.
1 1
An Analysis of the Altruistic Behavior in the Market: Why Does It Help Generate Ineffi  ciency?（Toru Umeda）
the legitimacy of the Labour Value Theory (LVT), 
long taken for granted since Adam Smith or before, 
and it instead prompted economists to accept the 
Theory of Marginal Utility (TMU). According to 
TMU, the value of a thing varies depending on the 
differing level of the utility a person gains through 
obtaining or consuming it, the logic of which could 
translate into the value of a thing being a matter of 
personal valuation. 
The application of the theory in a commercial 
context is found to be the varying price of an item 
depending on how much a consumer is willing to pay 
for it on one side of a market, and/or on how much a 
retailer is willing to sell (or a producer is willing to 
produce) an item on the other side. The demand curve 
representing the marginal relationship of the price of 
an item to aggregated consumersʼ willingness to pay 
for it ,  while the supply curve represents the 
relationship in which the price of an item varies as 
the willingness to provide it of aggregated suppliers 
(retailers or producers) increase or decrease, which 
modern economists tend to explain with the concept 
of marginal cost. 
Pre-revolutionary so-called ʻclassical economists ,ʼ 
having noticed a dynamic movement exist ing 
between demand and supply force in a market, failed 
to make a theoretical formulation. The concept of 
marginal ity enabled economists to make the 
breakthrough, and they came to be known as 
ʻneoclassical (school of) economists .ʼ A conviction 
shared by the school of economists that market 
dynamism ought to drive the price of a good to 
equilibrium led to the primacy of ʻexchange valueʼ 
over the concept of ʻuse value ,ʼ subsequently crowding 
out of economistsʼ vocabulary the term ʻuse value .ʼ 4
The discovery of the concept of scarcity is 
another landmark in the history of the discipline 
development. It led to the solution of the Diamond-
Water  Pa radox which had pu zzled classica l 
economists (Smith 1776). Classical economists failed 
to theoretically explain that the scarcity of diamond is 
the determinant of its higher value in exchange than 
water. ʻScarcityʼ came to stand as a crucial concept 
for the price-determining role of the market which 
became the primary concern of the economist in the 
following generations.
A characteristic of the economic theory of 
neoclassical economists is that a hypothetical human 
actor model designed to pursue its own interest or 
maximize its utility is enshrined in its basis. This 
selﬁ sh actor model is no more than homo economicus 
(HE).  The incorporation of the HE model in their 
theory meant that economists chose to focus on the 
only motivation (pursuit of self-interest) from among 
plural goal (or multi-motivational) patterns of human 
behaviors. An attention to this single motivation 
enabled economists to foresee human economic 
behavior (Marshall 1920: I.ii.7; Stout 2008: 160), and 
the focus on the foreseeability of human economic 
behaviors contributed to characterizing economics as 
a positive science. Positivism in economics self-
defined economics as something akin to natural 
science, which helped it exclude ethical or moral 
elements (Rothschild 1993: 16) 5. This process 
meanwhile meant that the economic system was 
separated from other systems such as political and 
social dimensions. 
The assumption that the agent in the HE model 
pursues only self-interest meant that the actor does 
not have to take into consideration othersʼ interests or 
communityʼs interests. The existence of others for a 
person, or of oneʼs having relationships with others, 
necessarily concerns morality or ethics. As the HE 
model manifests itself as isolated from other persons 
or a community it lives in, and committed to pursuing 
self-interest or maximizing utility on the base of cost-
benefit calculation, the agent is dispossessed of the 
ability to make an ethical judgment other than 
pursuing its own interest or utility: it is separated 
f rom a moral  va lue system. As seen above, 
considering that the HE model produced the thrust of 
economics toward a positive science, the adoption of 
3 Zouboulakis (2014) wrote: "The separation of economic from other social considerations was the result of the redeﬁ nition of the ﬁ eld of economic 
analysis by the marginalists at the end of nineteenth century." (p. 121).  
4 Menger (1871) used both concepts of ʻuse valueʼ and ʻexchange valueʼ, while Marshal (1920) exclusively used ʻexchange valueʼ in the sense of general 
purchasing power. Most economic textbooks these days no more deal with the word ʻuse valueʼ, indicating that it is not given a proper place in the 
textbook of economics. 
5 Rothschild (1993) notes: “The scientiﬁ cation of economics . . . has led to a separation of economics from its ethical roots. The ʻmainstream economicsʼ of 
the 20th century fully accepts this separation.”(p. 16). Hodgson (2011) writes: “Economics has mistakenly tried to fashion itself as an exact science akin 
to physics.”(p. 4).
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the model in neoclassical economics undoubtedly 
contributed to its crowding out moral and ethical 
elements from the construction of its related theories 
(Hodgson 2013: 4-5) 
Thus, the HE model has played an important role 
in widening the distance between economics and 
ethics6. 
The Relationship between ʜｏⅿｏ　
Ｅｃｏｎｏⅿｉｃｕｓ and Economic Rationality
The word ʻeconomic ʼ  involves an at t itude 
attaching importance to efficiency. The HE model 
was enshrined at the base of economic theory as an 
agent who rationally pursues economic efficiency. 
The rational choice by an HE forms the base of 
market eﬃ  ciency. 7
The problem concerns whether economic actors 
in markets always retain homo economicus-like nature. 
This authorʼs answer to this question is ʻNo .ʼ Real 
human beings in society do not always pursue 
economic rationality or eﬃ  ciency. While real human 
beings undoubtedly have an aspect of the HE model, 
it must also be recognized that they do often behave 
unlike the HE model. Much behavioral economics 
research demonstrates that people do make irrational 
choices (White & Staveren 2010: 3). 8
The irrational behaviors that HSE takes include 
actions or behaviors that does not seek (and produce) 
economic rationality or eﬃ  ciency. A demarcating line 
between the ʻpursuit ʼ  and the ʻnon-pursuit ʼ  of 
economic rationality can be drawn in theory, but two 
concepts do not represent a dichotomy. Though the 
ʻnon-pursuit ʼ  of economic rat ional it y can be 
distinguished from ʻpursuitʼ of economic rationality, 
the content range which the latter covers can be 
greatly diverse because of the combinations of the 
motivations and/or goals with the resulting behavioral 
patterns and effects which the actor is designed to 
take (Brennan 2009: xiii). Thus, the ʻnon-pursuitʼ of 
economic rationality inevitably involves complexity, 
which unsurprisingly in turn impeded a theorization 
or systematization of this aspect of human behavior 
in the economic discipline. 
Mainstream economists have succeeded, though, 
in establishing economic theory as an entity which 
they believe akin to natural science, by only focusing 
on the ʻpursuitʼ aspect while entirely dismissing the 
cumbersome ʻnon-pursuit ʼ  aspect concer ning 
economic rationality. The complexity impeding 
theorization, however, should not be a reason for the 
disregard or exclusion of the ʻnon-pursuit ʼ aspect 
concerning economic rationality. A well-designed 
economic agent model which can satisfy the need of 
incor porat ing th is ʻnon-pursuit ʼ  of economic 
rationality into theory is needed. This is a reason a 
new but diﬀ erent economic agent model called homo 
socio-economicus (HSE) has to be introduced in the 
place of the conventional HE model (OʼBoyle 1994; 
OʼBoyle 2011). 9
HSE can behave diﬀ erently from HE in so far as 
it is given diﬀ erent characteristics other than HE. HSE 
is defined, unlike HE, as an agent having various 
purposes or goals, with these goals not necessarily 
tied to economic eﬃ  ciency. It can take actions that do 
not meet economic eﬃ  ciency. That means that it can 
take economically ineff icient action including 
incurring losses, producing waste, or sacrificing 
energy or profit. This does not mean, however, that 
HSE does never pursue efficiency/rationality at any 
t ime. HSE  does pursue economic ef f iciency/
rationality, and more importantly, it can be regarded a 
6 Regarding this separation, Robbins (1948) notes more than 80 years ago (1st ed.): “Unfortunately it does not seem logically possible to associate the two 
studies in any form but mere juxtaposition. Economics deals with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations. The two ﬁ elds of enquiry 
are not on the same plane of discourse. Between the generalisations of positive and normative studies there is a logical gulf ﬁ xed which no ingenuity 
can disguise and no juxtaposition. In space or time bridge over (p. 148). Schabas (2005) depicts this separation process as ʻdenatularizationʼ of the 
economic order.
7 Pareto Optimality is among the concepts which mainstream economists espoused. Pareto Optimality situations requires as prerequisites that there is no 
externalities in the market and that each economic actor must take maximizing utility behavior in the market. Mainstream economists ought to 
recognize that irrational behaviors of economic actors jeopardize Pareto Optimality. Irrational actions produce market ineﬃ  ciency, see Buchanan (1985), 
pp.19-31, and Leibenstein (1987) points that irrational behavior trigger ineﬃ  ciency in organizations. 
8 “A large literature from behavioral economics and psychology ﬁ nds that people often make inconsistent choices, fail to learn from experience, exhibit 
reluctance to trade, base their own satisfaction on how their situation compares with the satisfaction of others and depart from the standard model of the 
rational economic agent in other ways.“ Kahneman and Kruger (2006), p. 3.
9 The words ʻhomo socio-economicusʼ was borrowed from OʼBoyle (1994); OʼBoyle (2011). Several alternatives to the homo economicus model have been 
proposed to date by scholars. They include ʻhomo reciprocansʼ by Bowels and Gintis (1998), ʻethical manʼ by Casson (1990), and more recently ʻHumanʼ 
against ʻeconʼ by Thaler (2015). 
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rational agent when it tries to work for realization of 
a social cause, an aspect to which mainstream 
economists have remained blind. That a person takes 
an action for a social cause means nothing but that he 
or she is taking an action or making a choice for a 
certain goal or goals; to this extent the person is 
(goal-)rationally behaving. 
The pursuit of economic rationality in this 
context is synonymous with the pursuit of self-
interest or utility maximization (Sen 1987:12). It is so 
especially in the languages used by mainstream 
economists whose fundamental conceptions of the 
economy and the economic agent are derived from 
those of neoclassical economists. The terms economic 
rationality and the terms ʻeconomic efficiencyʼ are 
interchangeable. In short, self-interested behaviors in 
economic agents are related to economic rationality 
and economic efficiency, and as a result of these 
actions economic rationality and economic eﬃ  ciency 
ought to be generated. Mainstream economic theories 
are based on these interchangeable conceptions.
This logic can apply to the HSE model. HSE can 
pursue economic rationality/efficiency, but at other 
times it does not pursue it as a result of which 
irrationality, inefficiency and/or waste would be 
generated by such actions or choices. This is because 
HSE is designed as behaving in both ways, rationally 
or irrationally. Risking the fallacy of simpliﬁ cation, 
the author summarizes the analysis above by 
sketching a rough contrast as follows: given a wide 
range of behavioral patterns attributable to HSE, 
ʻhomo economicus-likeʼ behaviors involves economic 
r a t iona l i t y  and ef f ic iency,  wh i le  ʻnon-homo 
economicus-likeʼ behaviors, which accords to the non-
pursuit of economic rationality (of an agent) outlined 
above, involves economic irrationality (in the sense of 
the under-maximizat ion of actor ʼs ut i l ity) or 
ineﬃ  ciency.10
What is the motivation of an HSE when it takes 
an irrational action or choice? What are supposed to 
be the causes? The causes of producing ineﬃ  ciency 
can be various and tend to be diffuse. Such causes 
may include illiteracy or under-literacy of economic 
knowledge, or inattentiveness of an agent. From the 
viewpoint of this author, who propounds the need to 
overcome economism as an alarm to prevalent egoism 
— a cause of which he thinks is economism — it is 
relevant to select, from a vast pool in which causal 
relationships between irrational behaviors or choices 
and their results, those kinds of non-economic 
reasoning such as a consideration to otherʼs interest or 
to communityʼs interest, or a contribution to a social 
cause. 
The par t  concer n ing the ʻnon-pursuit ʼ  of 
economic rationality, as noted above, involves a wide 
range of behavioral pat terns and motivational 
combinations and the resulting complexities. For the 
sake of convenience, in the rest of this paper, the 
author deliberately limits the scope of examination, 
focusing the choices that HSE deliberately and 
consciously makes, not the choices of rationality or 
ineff iciency that are made unconsciously. This 
limitation of the scope will hopefully contribute to 
clariﬁ cation of that the HSE do not behave rationally 
in any way, rather takes choices that may be against 
economic rationality in order to attain its own goals. 
Along with this, inefficiency which is produced 
because of inattention or the illiteracy of economic 
knowledge is not within the scope of this paper.
3.  Behavioral Patterns of ʜｏⅿｏ　 Ｓｏｃｉｏ︲
ｅｃｏｎｏⅿｉｃｕｓ
Based on the analysis above, the author will then 
demonstrate typical behaviors of the HSE model, 
utilizing a simulational exercise with a more speciﬁ c 
context, invoking explanations of the indifference 
curve which contemporary economic textbooks never 
fail to touch upon. 
Mankiwʼs Principles of Microeconomics is one of 
the most popular economic textbooks in Japan. “An 
indifferent curve shows the various bundles of 
consumption that make the consumer equally happy” 
(Mankiw 2010: 42). As Mankiw takes the example of 
the combination of Pepsi and pizza, the author will 
follow suit. Any point or all points on the same 
indiﬀ erent curve indicate that the consumer is equally 
satisﬁ ed with the combination of Pepsi and pizza. See 
the Figure titled The Consumerʼs Optimum.11 
10 I will use the italicized word of word ʻirrational or ʻirrationalityʼ in order to emphasize that it means ʻunder-satisfaction or under under-maximization of 
utility,ʼ that it does not mean ʻpurposeless.ʼ  
11 The ﬁ gure was taken from Mankiw 2010 only with Point C extrapolated by this author. 
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A 
Quantity 
of Pepsi 
Optimum 
B 
I3 
C 
I2 
I1 
Quantity 
of Pizza 
Budget constraint 0 
Figure 1 Consumerʼs Optimum
Three indifference curves were drawn for a 
single consumer. A higher indiﬀ erence curve shows 
the level of satisfaction of the consumer is higher 
than the others. Then, the textbook asks the following 
question: Which combination of Pepsi and pizza 
within the limited budget of the consumer represents 
the most rational choice?  Given a certain budget, the 
budget constraint line can be drawn as in Figure 1. 
Standard economicsʼ answer to the question is to 
choose the Optimum point where the indifferent 
curve I2 is tangent to the budget line. We are talking 
about the combination of Pepsi and pizza. The 
combination of these items at this Optimum point, 
which represents the highest satisfaction within the 
most efficient use of budget money, is most rational 
and most eﬃ  cient. An explanation attached to Figure 
1 is as follows: 
 The consumer chooses the points on his budget 
constraint that lies on the highest indifference 
curve. At this point, . . . the highest indiﬀ erence 
curve the consumer can reach is I2. The consumer 
prefers point A, which lies on indiﬀ erence curve 
I3, but the consumer cannot aﬀ ord this bundle of 
pizza and Pepsi.  By cont rast ,  point B is 
affordable, but because it l ies on a lower 
indiﬀ erence curve, the consumer does not prefer 
it. (Mankiw 2012: 441) 
As for the choice of point B, the note above 
explaining that ʻthe consumer does not prefer it ʼ 
means that the choice is one that a consumer will not 
make if he or she is rational enough. The choice at 
point B represents an irrational selection because the 
choice of combination of the items does not satisfy 
the consumer (not maximize his or her utility) while 
it represents an ineﬃ  cient choice in the sense that the 
consumer does not make an efficient use of the 
budget. It shows a double meaning of irrational 
choice. 
Let me explain the same thing using the two 
agent models, the HE and the HSE models. An HE is 
the human actor model on which mainst ream 
econom ic t heor ie s  have adopted a s  a  basic 
assumption, assuming it to reﬂ ect rational behavior. 
In this speciﬁ c case shown in Figure 1, any HE ought 
to choose the Optimum point without failure. On the 
contrary, an HSE is able to choose the Optimum point 
while it is still able to make choices other than the 
Optimum point. The range of choice for any HSE is in 
theory unlimited so that it can choose any point in the 
zone lower than the indiﬀ erent curve I1 in Figure 1. 
However, the author will limit the range of choice 
for a consumer for the sake of simpliﬁ cation. Let us 
assume that a consumer chooses point C. As point C 
represents a combination of less Pepsi and less pizza, 
the choice of point C would not satisfy the consumer. 
The indiﬀ erent curve I1 represents the combination of 
Pepsi and pizza that satisﬁ es his stomach. Though it 
is not clear if point C is on an indiﬀ erent curve or not, 
it is inferable that point C represents a lower level of 
satisfaction of the consumer, the point being located 
below any of the current indiﬀ erent curves shown in 
the ﬁ gure. A hypothetical HE would not choose point 
C as it represents an irrational, in the sense that it 
does not maximize its utility, choice. The choice of 
this point is also irrational for a hypothetical HSE. 
Any HE would not intentionally choose the point. On 
the contrary, an HSE might intentionally and/or 
consciously make this choice. 12
12 This point may be an interesting topic of ʻfreedom from economic rationalityʼ to discuss. It leads to the argument that human beings have a right to 
choose not to pursue economic rationality or eﬃ  ciency. Saeki (2012)ʼs following remarks shares the concern: “Something “irrational” or “wasteful” 
needs to be allowed to an extent in our life.” The implication of these arguments include that the scope of choice by consumers is far wider than 
economists have suggested. 
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4.  Why does the ʜＳＥ make an ｉｒｒａｔｉｏｎａˡ 
choice?
Why does HSE make the choice of point C?  An 
explorat ion for the reasons is not something 
mainstream economists are likely to tackle. For 
mainstream economics adopting the HE model as a 
basic assumption, the mission is to indicate that the 
choices of point B and point C are both irrational. 
Once indicated, the mission is thought to be 
completed, with no further exploration required. 
However, since we have introduced the HSE model, 
we must be interested in the reasons of irrational 
choices made by HSE. With the conditions given, 
including purchasing item like Pepsi and pizza, in 
Figure 1, a lack of information on consumer ʼs 
motivation would limit the scope of plausible 
answers. An answer of reasoning may be something 
like ʻout of consideration of his own health ,ʼ which 
reminds me of the Japanese conventional axiom 
Hara-hachi-bun’me (whose literal meaning is that 80 
percent gastric fullness is desirable).  A plausible 
reason of that choice by the consumer may be ʻout of 
concern for his health.ʼ   Despite being a goal-rational 
choice, this choice should be regarded as irrational in 
the sense that it does not maximize its utility. 
Furthermore, the choice shows that it inwardly 
diverts from the budget constraint line, which means 
that there some budget left unused, pointing to 
ineff iciency. If we use standard terms which 
mainstream economists prefer to use, the point shows 
non-Pareto Optimal choice, leaving room for 
improvement. 
The core information Figure 1 intends to convey 
to the reader is the relationship between given two 
commodities, Pepsi and pizza, on one hand, and the 
consumer, on the other; it does not contain any 
information on the socio-economic conditions in 
which the consumer is situated, such as from whom 
he is going to buy those items. This situational design 
is the source of producing HE. The isolation of HE 
from its social background structure is the necessary 
condition of the model13. This understanding helps us 
transfer with ease the HE model to the HSE model; 
we can only extrapolate some additional information 
on environmental conditions around the model into 
the conditions given in Figure 1. 
Then what kinds of socio-political conditions 
need to be added? A minimum requirement of 
information necessary to be added may be the 
existence of a person which is ideally diﬀ erent from a 
seller of Pepsi and/or pizza. Let us assume that 
another person is hypothetically put in the Figure 1 
condition with the consumer, Pepsi and pizza given 
as they are. In which situation does this consumer, 
who is supposed to be you, make a choice which does 
not maximize your satisfaction in this case?  We shall 
start with this question. 
Suppose a hypothetically-added person in front 
of you is hungry and thirsty, while you are not either 
hungry or thirsty. If you offer, out of sympathy 
toward this miserable person before you, to share 
with him some portion of Pepsi and pizza which you 
have just bought, keeping yourself under-satisfied, 
your choice of oﬀ er or give-help decision then might 
be judged as irrational in the strict sense that your full 
satisfaction had to be sacrificed by your charitable 
behavior.
A plausible objection expected to be raised to 
this simulation is that such a situation is far from 
reality14. Yes, it is a hypothetical case, most simpliﬁ ed 
for the sake of promoting understanding by the 
reader. Even with given Pepsi and pizza, several 
stories of hypothesis could be made up, and if freed 
from the given commodities, far more manifold, 
close-to reality stories could be provided to explain 
the case of an under-satisfied, altruistic in a sense, 
consumer we have seen above. In a nutshell, there are 
virtually unlimited sets of combination of the agent 
other than the consumer and/or socio-economical 
environments centering the consumer appearing in 
Figure 1. Thus, the ʻfar-from-realityʼ objection above 
13 The HE model is assumed in the background of both the demand curve and the supply curve. It stands an isolated model divorced from other 
socioeconomic situations. Tominaga (1997) called it a ʻmonadic modelʼ, referring to the constructions in which the model is placed, saying: “The 
consumer looks as if it singularly faces an item (good). In reality, a bilateral transaction between the seller and the buyer is characterized as ʻdyadic 
modelʼ(p. 38). 
14 Another objection that may be raised is the argument that since the purchaser is satisﬁ ed with the purchase of those items, meaning that his utility is 
satisﬁ ed, his giving some portion of pizza and beverage to another person should be regarded as a purely social behavior, not an economic one. The 
identiﬁ cation of the purchase, prior to digestion of pizza and beverage, with the satisfaction of his utility, as economists often do, is misleading because 
the timing of real satisfaction comes at his eating and drinking those items, not at his purchasing the items. 
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certainly ﬁ nds ungrounded.
Amartya Sen called a choice which does not lead 
to maximizing oneʼs utility ʻcounter-preferential 
choiceʼ (Sen 1977: 33). The question we raised to be 
asked is: Why do people make a ʻcounter-preferential 
choice? We had been looking for other-regarding 
reasoning rather than self-regarding reasoning, which 
is relatively with ease to conceive, a sample of which 
is that the consumer does so ʻout of concern for his 
health .ʼ We came to understand that the answer to the 
question is theoretically reachable, and we gained one 
at last by extrapolating socioeconomic conditions 
into an isolated HE condition. With application of this 
to a more realistic context, we have reached with 
conﬁ dence an answer that reasoning such as ʻfor the 
sake of othersʼ or ʻfor the sake of societyʼ could be 
relevant motivations, even if par tly, causing a 
consumer to make a counter-preferential choice. 
Let me put the issues in order. ʻFor the sake of 
othersʼ or ʻfor the sake of societyʼ reasoning is not 
applicable to HE as it is isolated from socioeconomic 
conditioned it would be in15. A real human being can, 
at least sometimes, if not often, give up part or whole 
of his interest or benefit, which would otherwise 
accrue to him (or would be maximized) as a result of 
his behaving for the sake of others or for the sake of a 
community it belong to or acts in. This sacriﬁ ce can 
be regarded as an irrational choice meaning that it 
does not help maximize its own interest, thus 
economically ineﬃ  cient as well. 
HE does (can) not make this choice, while HSE 
may make this choice. The diﬀ erence is evident: the 
former is an economic agent isolated from any social 
environments except an object or more appearing 
before him for assessment, while the latter, designed 
to work in a real socioeconomic situation, is an agent 
close to a real human being; the former too simpliﬁ ed 
an agent modeled after a human being, while the 
latter takes more manifold behavioral patterns. 
5. Altruistic behaviors in the market
The HSE model needs to be conceived as part of 
real socioeconomic situations in which it is assumed 
to behave, and into these situations ethical and/or 
moral principles, rules and concepts are incorporated. 
Then, how are ethical and/or moral elements related 
to irrational (meaning economically ineﬃ  cient) choice 
or action of HSE?  
Commitment, as Sen wrote, involves counter-
preferential choice (Sen 1977: 93).  It “ involves 
choosing an action that yields a lower expected 
welfare than an alternative available action.” Sen 
recognized that it is in the public good area in which 
the question of commitment is most important, while 
he wrote in “the private choice of many consumer 
goods, the scope for the exercise of commitment is 
may indeed be limited” (Sen 1977: 95). In fact, the 
cases he referred to in the book are “such exotic acts 
as the boycotting of South African avocados or the 
eschewing of Spanish holidays.” No doubt that the 
public goods area is the one where commitment 
needs to be exercised, what this author interested in 
is the possibility that economic agent in a market 
exercises commitment. In my observations, to be 
shown below, choices which can be regarded as kind 
of commitment have been exercised even in a market 
context. Such reasons as ʻfor the sake of somebodyʼ or 
ʻfor the beneﬁ t of societyʼ can be inferred from those 
cases signifying the exercise of commitment. 
Let me take up an example of irrational or self-
sacr if icing purchases. In the af termath of the 
earthquakes of April 2016 hitting the Kyushu Region 
of southern Japan, mass media reported that a number 
of citizens went to what Japanese people call an 
antenna shop, a shop selling local specialties. People 
reportedly stood in a long queue before the opening 
of the shop located in central Tokyo to purchase 
products made in Kumamoto, the most aﬄ  icted area 
of the quake. Some of the shoppers might have come 
to purchase goods they like, but others might have 
bought things not in need, but goods related to 
15 Any altruistic elements can be drawn from HE. Altruistic economics propounded by Becker (1976); Becker (1981) deals with a diﬀ erent model from HE. 
An actor gaining utility from taking altruistic behavior for another person is far from the archetype of HE as taking an altruistic action indicates non-
homo economicus nature. Mainstream economists tend to think that economics can defend altruistic action by using self-interest maximization theory 
like one coming out of Beckerʼs ingenuity. Altruistic economics helped strengthen links between economics and the self-interest pursuit assumption. It 
is ironical enough that altruistic economics further helped solidify the selﬁ sh behavior ground. The point often overlooked is that eﬃ  ciency is sacriﬁ ced 
in return for such altruistic behaviors. A predominant focus placed on utility maximization might have helped prevent the eﬃ  ciency lost concern from 
emerging in sight as a problem. 
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Kumamoto out of consideration that they would like 
to support producers in Kyushu or contribute to the 
regionʼs economy by their purchasing Kumamoto 
products. Purchases driven from such motivations 
would violate the assumption of the HE model which 
by deﬁ nition ought to behave to maximize his utility. 
A choice of a shopper not maximizing its own utility 
or even sacriﬁ cing its own utility can be regarded as 
an exercise of commitment .ʼ If a person purchased 
things he did not need, one can argue that the purpose 
of the purchase was to support the people or the 
economy of the aﬄ  icted region and can be regarded 
as a typical case of commitment.16
A purchase for the sake of someone could be 
denominated ʻcompassionate consumptionʼ—or 
ʻethically driven purchaseʼ may be a more neutral 
expression. Economics assume that an agent 
consumes something for his or her own sake so that 
consumption for someone else violates the economic 
logic, thus being not a rational consumption. In 
practice, however, compassionate consumption 
practices have become a fact. A campaign called ʻOne 
for One campaignʼ that the US brand TOMS started 
ten years ago may be a typical example for a 
promotion of such consumption17. When a consumer 
purchases a TOMS brand item—shoes, eyewear, 
coffee etc.—the company TOMS donates the same 
unit of it to those who need it in a developing country. 
This campaign is no less than the companyʼs CSR 
activity as the donor is TOMs itself, not consumers. 
If a consumer purchases a TOMS good knowing that 
his or her purchase would contribute to the poor in a 
developing country, it is no longer a consumption to 
exclusively satisfy his or her utility. In order to 
sustain this business model TOMS might put higher 
prices on goods of its brand than otherwise. It means 
it virtually gives up setting a normal price, while 
consumers choosing TOMS brand goods intentionally 
choose higher priced goods. This business model 
could not be sustained without such commitment by 
both side of the transaction. 
Another pattern of compassionate consumption 
can be seen in a practice called suspended coffee, 
which reportedly has originated a century ago in 
Naples in Italy (Asahi Shinbun 2014, 2016). A 
customer in a coffee shop adopting the suspended 
coffee system pays two cups of coffee and consume 
only one cup, withholding the amount for the other 
cup of coffee for someone having no money for 
coﬀ ee. Paying double for just one cup of coﬀ ee to be 
consumed is not an economically rational choice. 
Should the (economic) irrationality of this choice be 
denied, any consumption of consumers would be 
regarded as rational, which is tautological. 18 
Let us look at the issue f rom a dif ferent 
perspective. The choice of the Optimum point may be 
producing economical rat ionality. A standard 
assumption is that each agent makes such a rational 
choice, and that the aggregation of each rational 
choice or the accumulative result of such choices is 
also positively approvable. A conviction that rational 
pursuit of oneʼs own interest would promote the well-
being of the whole society or serve to public interest 
accords to what Adam Smith ʻs the ʻinvisible hand ʼ 
metaphor seems to suggest. 
The convict ion has been unscr upulously 
inherited and remains dominant to this day. Should 
the process generate any negative effect, it would 
successfully be pushed out of the economic system as 
ʻexternalitiesʼ: some separate measures to address 
such externalities are incorporated into the theories 
of economic systems which mainstream economists 
advocate. So much so that a sophisticated system has 
been established to date, economists have not had to 
be bothered by questions on the ethical /moral 
relevancy of the aggregated or accumulated results of 
rational pursuit of each economic agent. 
Meanwhile, critics have long been pointing that 
16 Röpke (1963)ʼs following observations are not far from the point. There are businesses which embrace more or less an element of self-sacriﬁ ce (and, 
therefore, uncompensated “giving”) and of genuine service. The medical profession is one example. The, too, we expect of the scholar and of artist that 
they put devotion to their vacations before mere gain, and that I practicing their profession they be not motivated by the principles of the delicatessen-
owner. . . . Expressions such as “trade” or “business,” applied to the professions of medicine or law, are felt to be out of place and demeaning.”(p. 22).
17 https://www.toms.com/beyond-one-for-one
18 Economists may defend by the help of so-called ʻwarm-glowʼ theory arguing that a consumer paying double for a cup of coﬀ ee out of concern for 
someone in need ﬁ ts perfectly economically rationality because the payer gains another kind of utility (satisfaction or psychological elevation gained 
through an altruistic action). The ʻwarm-glowʼ theory assumes an actor maximizes his utility in return for taking an altruistic action to others. This 
reasoning, as argued earlier, does not ﬁ t HE explanations as the ʻwarm-glowʼ theory assumes a diﬀ erent actor model than HE. Paying double contradicts 
economic rationality meaning thrifty. It should not be overlooked that the ʻwarm-glowʼ theory paradoxically explains there are some altruistic persons in 
real society. 
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the accumulative growth of each economic agentʼs 
maximization of satisfaction would threat to generate 
social negatives, such as jeopardizing the health of 
the natural environment. A ʻTragedy of the Commonsʼ 
alarm made by Garrett Hardin (Hardin 1968) is a 
typical example and a ʻLimits to Growth ʼ alarm 
issued by the Club of Rome in the early 1970s is 
another. Both represent calls for ethical/moral 
reassessments on what have been established as 
standard practices. In recent developments, the 
governmentʼs initiative to consider a need to legally 
regulate so-called high frequency trading (HFT) 
which would jeopardize the stability of the ﬁ nancial 
market has relevancy in this topic. 
The problem raised above can be summarized in 
t he  fol lowi ng.  I f  i t  wou ld be clea r  t ha t  t he 
accumulative result of economically rational choices 
made by each agent would generate negative fallouts, 
economic agents, as ethical agents, would wisely be 
advised to reconsider the legit imacy of thei r 
economic standard behaviors, only to make choices 
adhering to lower levels of satisfaction (under-
satisfaction). This process is the exercise of ʻvirtue of 
prudence,ʼ which Adam Smith mentioned in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1790) and Sen 
(1986) appreciated in his works. It also relates to what 
Ostrom (1990) argued for19. If this logic of thinking 
be approved, the choice is economically irrational one 
as it does not maximize the utility of the HE-
conditioned chooser20. Note that the choice was 
certainly rational as far as it was made aiming to 
support or realize certain the social cause which is 
reducing negative effect of his or her economic 
actions on the society. 
Hav i ng  showca se d  ex a mple s  i nvolv i ng 
commitment exercised in market contexts, this author 
makes two additional comments. First, the pattern of 
commitment behavior can vary. To have an overall 
view of the issue and to make further analysis, an 
attempt to categorize a wide variety of commitment 
patterns is expected to be addressed in the future. 
Second, we should recognize the fact that such a 
variety of commitment behaviors have already taken 
place in society. Put aside the question of whether 
these behaviors can be regarded as altruistic, they 
undoubtedly involve ethical or moral elements in one 
sense or another. This indicates that the traditional 
ʻself-interest maximizationʼ theory has to work too 
hard to relevantly and convincingly explain the 
quality of commitment-related actions taken in a 
market context.
Concluding Remarks
One of the main characteristics of the HE model 
lies in its isolation from all social background 
conditions except the limited amount of information 
such as presence of an object or two for it to mull 
over and/or information on the price(s), or the amount 
of resources available. The model is designed as an 
agent aiming to maximize its own interest, itself 
freed from any social constraint including ethical or 
moral concerns; the only constraint, if any, is budget 
constraint or the limited amount of resources given. 
This isolation not only underlies the economic agent; 
it may also involve the separation of the economic 
system from other socio-political and ethical systems. 
The HSE model, designed to overcome the ﬂ aws 
mentioned above, posits an agent who can behave in 
given socio-political conditions, which inherently 
includes ethical and/or moral elements including 
social institutions21. The introduction of the HSE 
model ushers in ethical/moral elements into the 
circumstances in which it acts; thus it, as an agent 
19 Ostrom (1990) demonstrated that several parties sharing a commons able to manage the commons through their voluntary provisions of resources 
without any help of public power. This implies the possibility that actorʼs voluntary action for public interest may help resolve economic externalities. 
20 Suppose a case in which an economic actor decides to decrease his use of resources considering that accumulative eﬀ ects of choices, even if rational, by 
each actor would lead to enhanced risk of the depletion of the natural resources. This decision seems rational at ﬁ rst glance, but it involves the loss of 
eﬃ  ciency taking place in the side of this actor since he has to sacriﬁ ce (or give up) some of its utility he would otherwise get. This case indicates how 
pro-social concern works in practice with a fraction of loss inevitably accruing. This explains why an ʻinternalization of externalitiesʼ procedure, which 
we borrow from mainstream economistsʼ vocabulary, would be required. Parties concerned, on trying to solve a social issue by sharing the cost, would 
emerge as homo socio-economicus, not homo economicus. The point of my emphasis is that the internalization of externalities is a result of an 
externalization process. If there were no externalities, there would be no need for the internalization of them.
21 It must be admitted that the practical availability of the HSE model is rather limited as Thaler (1992) put it: “Writing down a model of rational behavior 
and turning the crank may not be enough, and writing down a good model of less than fully rational behavior is diﬃ  cult for two reasons. First, it is not 
generally possible to build good descriptive models without collecting data, and many theorists claim to have a strong allergic reaction to data. Second, 
rational models tend to be simple and elegant with precise predictions, while behavioral models tend to be complicated, and messy, with much vaguer 
predictions.”(p. 198)
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equipped with a normative sense of ethics and 
morality, plays an important role in connecting 
economics and ethics. 
Making use of the HSE model, in comparison 
with the HE model, the author tried to shed light on 
the logics of how the altruistic behavior of the 
economic actor in the market may and can be 
generating a fraction of ineﬃ  ciency in the process of 
it s decision-making-and-act ion. Ineff iciency 
generated as a result of an altruistic behavior is 
defined from an economistic viewpoint under the 
mainstream economistsʼ framework. It does not 
necessarily reﬂ ect ineﬃ  cient elements in a practical 
life. This in no way means that this author depreciates 
the concept of ineﬃ  ciency in general. Rather I argue 
that more light needs to be shed on some negatively 
valued concepts, such as inefficiency and waste, in 
the discourse and analysis of socioeconomic realities 
in which consumers sometimes take various types of 
altruistic action even in markets. Through what 
f ramework an obser ver t akes a look at  how 
consumers behave in the market is key. 
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